Abstract: This paper investigates the opportunities and challenges of incorporating more accurate policy representations into institutional partial equilibrium commodity models. Six issues for constructing relevant policy models are raised: defining the commodity space for heterogeneous products; the role of vertical linkages; assessing market power; the changing nature of government support; trade policy; and data requirements. The importance of product attributes and different approaches to modeling product differentiation are presented. A case study of food safety is used to bring together the issues of product attributes and differentiation, the importance of the market linkages, trade policy and market power. Although institutional commodity models still have a role to play, this study advocates the use of smaller idiosyncratic models to address many of the relevant policy questions in a rapidly changing sector.
Developing Policy Relevant Agrifood Models

Background
Large econometric partial equilibrium models are a mainstay of forecasting and policy analysis at national agriculture departments, international organizations and some policy centers associated with universities. These models are large, require significant amounts of labor and data to update and maintain, and are not particularly flexible with respect to the policy issues that they can address. Essentially, the current models are designed to evaluate commodity specific "farm programs" at the primary level. Given the rapid changes that are taking place within the agrifood sector, are these models capable of addressing current and evolving policy questions? What are the opportunities and limitations for incorporating more accurate representations in these models? Is a one-size-fits-all model appropriate for analyzing every policy issue or should smaller more flexible models be customized to the issue at hand? It is to these questions that this paper is addressed; however it is far easier to raise questions than it is to identify solutions.
The nature of government policies are evolving over time. Commodity specific price instruments have been changed into direct income transfers to producers. Policy makers are increasingly concerned with food safety, environmental degradation, rural development, new industrial uses for agricultural products, biotechnology and the recurring issue of increased concentration and market power in the processing, wholesaling and retailing sectors.
Not only have agricultural policies changed, but so is the nature of the products that are being produced and traded -products with unique attributes have taken on much greater importance than they did historically. These attributes often relate to how the product is produced and are as broad ranging as: is the production process environmentally friendly; is the food processor socially responsible; are there potential long-term health problems associated with consumption of the good. The changing nature of consumer tastes, and the production of agricultural commodities with different attributes has resulted in a marketplace filled with differentiated products where a single homogeneous "commodity" used to dominate. With product differentiation the potential to exercise market power throughout the value chain is enhanced, as is the potential for primary producers to earn price premiums for differentiated output. For commodity models to have relevance they have to account for product differentiation and economically important niche markets.
In the next section the role of commodity models in a changing policy environment is explored. The challenges facing policy makers are discussed and six issues that need to be considered in building relevant policy models are presented. Many of the concerns of policy makers relate to the attributes of agrifood products. While consumers have always been faced with different qualities of products, policy makers' attention is increasingly focused on consumer driven agriculture and product differentiation. Section 3 discusses how differentiated products are modeled and how attributes are measured. Section 4 uses food safety as a case study that brings together the issues of product attributes and differentiation, the importance of vertical market linkages, trade policy and market power.
Issues in Constructing Relevant Policy Models
Agricultural policy makers and senior bureaucrats are involved in a sector that is perceived to be shrinking. Although farming accounts for less than one percent of United
States gross domestic product, the entire food and fiber system spanning farm inputs, agricultural production, processing, trade and ancillary services -accounts for 16 percent of gross domestic product (USDA 2001) . Increasingly, the policy focus is on the broader definition of the agrifood sector rather than being confined to commodity programs. Most of the growth in the agrifood sector is beyond the farm gate and this has captured policy maker's attention.
Trade is an increasingly important component of the demand for agrifood products and it has always been viewed as an engine of growth. Low and medium income countries are the markets with the most potential for growth in food consumption.
While these markets will consume more bulk commodities, most of the export growth will come from trading the higher-value and consumer-ready products that already dominate agrifood trade. Unlike bulk commodities, higher valued products are differentiated products, and trade is often two-way between countries with similar resource endowments. Institutional policy models must account for the nature of this trade in forecasting and in determining the gains from trade.
There is also potential for growth, both domestically and through exports, with non-traditional products. For example, specialty chemicals derived from plants, ethanol and bio-fuels, nutraceuticals, and industrial adhesives all represent non-traditional uses of agricultural commodities. The attributes necessary to produce these products may differentiate the primary agricultural input for these non-traditional products from other bulk commodities.
Consumers expect the food system to deliver more -greater variety, improved safety and nutrition, greater convenience, and fewer environmental impacts. The response of the food-processing sector to the demand for differentiated products has been better coordination throughout the supply chain so that consumer signals are transmitted more effectively. This results in a wide variety of marketing arrangements with more (production and marketing) contracts between individual producers and processors and increased vertical coordination (USDA 2001) . Increased concentration and thinning cash markets also raise concerns about the potential abuse of market power and the problems associated with structural change.
Policy makers are being forced to understand more complex markets and they want models that will aid in explaining the changes that are happening, resolving policy issues, and predicting future changes. The focus of the modeling effort has to encompass food processing and other post-farm activities. Policy makers are concerned with vertical relationships along the supply chain. Relevant models must not only account for crosscommodity effects but must also account for relationships between different levels of the supply chain. As decisions are internalized within a few integrated entities, the concept of a market becomes blurred and as a result it is extremely difficult to model this behavior. As a consequence, the economic information required by senior decision makers is broad and varied and it seems unlikely one model can serve all purposes. The future of policy models, small or large, depends on their ability to address the market impacts associated with this multitude of issues.
There are a few large multi-commodity, multi-country, partial equilibrium trade models (e.g. FAPRI, AGLINK, ESIM) that are regularly used for policy analysis and forecasting. 1 In most cases these models have a long history and the use of the models is restricted to members of the institutions that own them. One way to judge if a model is relevant is to ask if it would be built in the same manner if the research institution were to start from scratch? We suspect that in many cases that the answer would be no.
The first decision in building a new model is whether it should be a partial or general equilibrium model. Partial equilibrium models are best used when the impacts of the policy change are largely limited to the sector in question. 2 The strength of the current institutional commodity models is their broad commodity coverage, within agriculture, across many countries and regions. The disaggregation that is possible in a partial equilibrium model is typically greater than in a general equilibrium model. Partial equilibrium models are capable of addressing linkages among several levels of the market, but the coverage is typically unprocessed or first-stage processed agricultural products (van Tongeren et.al. 2001) .
Often it is possible to introduce more institutional detail into partial equilibrium models than in general equilibrium models. Incorporation of policies in general equilibrium models typically involves using price wedges in price linkage equations for various agents in the economy. Direct representation of policies through the incorporation of the actual policy mechanism is the preferred approach. Since the structure of partial equilibrium models is more flexible it is, at least conceptually, easier to incorporate these policy mechanisms in partial equilibrium models. Therefore this study will only focus on the development of policy relevant partial equilibrium models although the issues raised are equally important for general equilibrium models.
Any institution that decides to build a new partial equilibrium policy model will have to confront six issues. The first issue is how to define the relevant commodity space when food products are becoming more heterogonous? Second, the model must be designed to account for vertical relationships through multiple levels of the supply chain. is now discussed in turn.
Defining the commodity space with heterogeneous products
The definition of a commodity/product is the key issue in developing a relevant institutional model and this issue cuts across all other considerations discussed in this paper. When a new attribute -for example a genetic modification or a particular processing method -is introduced for a traditional commodity is there one product or two? The answer depends on product differentiation, which is typically thought of as a demand-side consideration (and will be considered in detail in section 3.0) but it has supply-side implications as well. 
The role of vertical relationships
It is as important to account for the relationships between various levels of a supply chain, as it is to account for cross-commodity effects. For new products, how are the benefits distributed through the supply chain? For new regulations designed to enhance food safety or to change the quality characteristics of products, how are the costs distributed through the supply chain? General equilibrium models have the capacity to account for these vertical linkages because the model accounts for all factor and product markets in the economy. However, problems with aggregation limit the usefulness of general equilibrium models to address some of the questions associated with vertical markets and it may be desirable to use a somewhat more ad hoc approach.
One alternative to a complete general equilibrium model draws on the work of Muth (1964) , Floyd (1965) and Gardner (1975) and accounts for equilibrium across several product and factor markets. This equilibrium displacement technique shares many features with general equilibrium modeling but does not account for the feedback between factor incomes and product demand. Equilibrium displacement models use multi-market equilibrium elasticities to determine the incidence of policies across input and output markets. 3 The ability to calibrate these models, with minimal data on prices, quantities, and elasticities, allows the researcher to examine the relationships between several levels of a supply chain.
Equilibrium displacement models can be derived using either the homogenous or differentiated product assumption. James and Alston (2002) incorporate quality variation (vertical differentiation) in an equilibrium displacement model with high and low quality goods where there is substitution between the two qualities in terms of both supply and demand.
Market power
Consideration of imperfectly competitive market structures opens up a Pandora 's
Box of theoretical problems. Nonetheless, an increasing number of policy questions require consideration of imperfect competition, since agrifood products are becoming increasingly differentiated and contracting and vertical integration are more frequent.
Having said this, what is the nature of the market power -oligopoly, oligopsony or both?
Who holds the market power: processors, retailers or both? Sexton, et. al. (2003) approach uses explicit economic models with final demand, input demand, and product supply (marginal cost) to measure market power and this design can be incorporated into a model of broader market interactions. These models do not impose a particular type of oligopolistic/oligopsonistic behavior (e.g. Cournot), but allow the data to determine the type of conduct and allow the researcher to test for alternative types of market conduct.
The NEIO models are capable of measuring market power at multiple levels of the food chain (Sexton et. al. 2003) .
Data considerations contribute to the problems of measuring market power.
Typically, NEIO studies are conducted with data for aggregate industries at the national level. The inability to define relevant markets and aggregation problems creates a bias against finding market power (Sexton 2000). Holloway (1991) used an equilibrium displacement model to extend the Gardner's (1975) model to test for market conduct.
This approach may prove useful for incorporating market power into relevant market models.
The changing nature of government support
The U.S. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 changed the nature of how support was provided to farmers in the United States. 4 The method of transfer changed from market-based interventions to direct payments. These transfers are based on fixed criteria including historic yields and area. Since producers cannot affect the size of the government payout, they should only base their production decisions on market signals and not government payments. However, these direct transfers can still influence production decisions through indirect channels. For instance, if producers are risk averse and they receive a direct transfer, then the wealth effect could reduce their risk aversion and may affect their production decisions. Likewise, if a producer faces a credit constraint, a wealth transfer could change his investment decisions because the credit constraint is relaxed. Although current payments are not tied to current production, there is a potential expectations effect, where the producer may attempt to expand current output in order to increase the base on which future payments may be determined. Capturing all of these effects in one model is, to say the least, problematic. There are multiple mechanisms through which policy measures may affect farmers' production decisions. Nonetheless, certain modifications would make agrifood models more relevant in assessing the impacts of direct payments. Incorporation of risk and risk preferences into supply response would help address some issues associated with wealth effects. Models that include factor markets are more appropriate for assessing production decisions. Input subsidies (taxes) are also better addressed through the factor market.
Furthermore, since most government transfers tend to become capitalized in land values, including factor markets will account for this effect. Moreover, as agricultural policy changes to focus on the protection of the environment and food safety, government regulations have the potential to raise producers' costs. If the government provides compensation, it is desirable to model the effects of these payments on production decisions and this should be done through the factor market. Finally, addressing investment decisions explicitly should help explain the effects of direct payments on production decisions.
Trade policy
Modeling trade flows has always been problematic but now the major issue is how to account for intra-industry (where a country both imports and exports the same good) trade in consumer ready products. Most commodity models are net trade models, so a country is either a net importer or net exporter of the commodity in question. Net trade models have tended to be used to explain trade in a limited number of homogeneous raw commodities, but increasingly trade is in differentiated processed products and consumer ready goods (Gehlhar and Coyle (2001) ). Intra-industry trade is important even at high levels of disaggregation with countries reporting imports and exports of the same good (van Tongeren et.al. 2001 ). The Armington (1969) specification is the most popular method to handle trade in differentiated products but at the same time it is highly restrictive (Carter and Alston (1990) ).
Many policy disputes and policy instruments are bilateral in nature. Trade policy is not as simple as measuring tariffs and quotas. Different tariffs are applied to imports from different regions because of preferential access. Bound tariffs (maximum tariff level commitments made to the WTO) are not always identical to the tariffs that are applied. Grant and Meilke (2003) found that the gap between bound and applied tariffs in the world's major wheat importing countries equaled 62 percentage points after the Uruguay Round tariff cuts were implemented. Partial equilibrium commodity models often use tariff equivalents to measure quantitative restrictions. Alternatively, imports can be treated as fixed to represent a quota. However, quotas are not always binding, so the tariff equivalent should be zero. A policy shock may cause a non-binding quota to bind. Tariff rate quotas are multi-tiered tariffs that can have the characteristics of both tariffs and quotas. 5 In some instances where foreign companies make direct investments in the domestic market, imports may be replaced by domestic sales of the affiliate of the foreign company. As trade barriers fall the location of production of certain foods will move across the globe to where the raw inputs and other factors are the cheapest. This behavior cannot be described with a non-spatial net trade model. In many cases, the models are not estimated econometrically, but are calibrated to baseline data. The advantage of calibration is that the process is not data intensive, exploits theoretical restrictions and is consistent with benchmark data. The calibration exercise requires information on budget or cost shares, elasticities of substitution and possibility price, and income elasticities and supply elasticities. Calibrated models need updating to stay current, but so do the parameters of models that were initially estimated with econometrics.
Data requirements
Summary
The consideration of the above six issues is crucial in developing relevant policy models, even though it may not be feasible to address all of the issues in one model.
Cutting across all six issues is the proper definition of a product. In the next section we elaborate on the importance of product attributes and the different ways to handle new or highly differentiated products in a market model. Then, in section 4, a case study of food safety regulations is used to illustrate how the six modeling issues influence the choice of a proper modeling framework.
Product Differentiation and The Role of Attributes
Model builders face a number of problems in their attempts to carry out relevant policy analysis in a changing agrifood sector. A recurring problem is that they typically treat agricultural products as homogenous when these products are rapidly becoming more differentiated. Product differentiation is partially driven by the consumer's desire for specific product attributes. These attributes may include safety, convenience, quality, location, health and nutrition, ethical issues, and process attributes such as environmental quality, animal welfare, or genetic modifications. This section addresses the question of how product differentiation can be addressed in an institutional model and how to model and measure product attributes.
Since the 1920's product differentiation is a subject that has been of interest to economists. Goods are almost always differentiated by some characteristic: quality, location, time, availability, consumer's information and so on. Given the broad number of methods to distinguish products it is convenient to categorize the different ways that consumers differentiate between goods based on a small subset of characteristics and the associated preferences. Horizontally differentiated products vary in certain product characteristics that appeal to distinct groups of consumers. With vertical differentiation, goods with the same characteristics, differ in quality so that all consumers prefer the higher quality products.
There are two different approaches to horizontal differentiation. One approach goes back to Chamberlin (1933) , where the consumers prefer diversity and utility is an increasing function of the number of varieties (Dixit and Stiglitz (1976) , Spence (1976) ).
In the second approach, associated with Hotelling (1929) consumer heterogeneity is due to different locations or tastes. Although Hotelling's approach referred to the physical location of the consumer, location can also mean the distance between the brand characteristic that a particular consumer views as ideal and the characteristics of the brand actually purchased (Lancaster (1979) ).
So far, the discussion of product differentiation has focused on endogenous factors, but differentiation can also be determined exogenously. The best-known case of an exogenously differentiated product is one that is differentiated by country of origin (Armington (1969) ). This type of model is frequently used to account for intra-industry trade, but it is not specific about the reasons why products differ across countries.
Endogenous product differentiation is of more use for determining the impact of varying product attributes. However, it is not always practical to distinguish between vertical and horizontal product differentiation. Furthermore, neither the neo-Chamberlin nor the neo-Hotelling framework is superior in all settings. Since horizontal differentiation refers to the concept of product variety rather than quality it more useful to analyze issues such as brand loyalty, rather than issues such as food safety which is more appropriately dealt with in a vertically differentiated model.
Describing consumer behavior in terms of choosing between bundles of attributes, or characteristics, also has a long history in economics going back to Houtakker (1952) and Theil (1952) . Houtakker described a good in terms of quantity and quality where the consumer selects both the quantity and characteristics of the good. Goods with different characteristics were treated as the same good but as having different qualities. The price of each good is determined by the amount of characteristics chosen.
Lancaster (1966, 1971) developed another version of a characteristics model. He viewed goods as bundles of characteristics and argued that utility is derived from these characteristics. Consumers maximize utility, defined in terms of characteristics, subject to a budget constraint defined in terms of goods. Since utility and the budget constraint are defined in different units, Lancaster introduced a technical relationship between the quantity of a product and the attributes that it possesses. This theoretical model is the conceptual basis for a number of different approaches that attempt to measure attributes.
So how are the values of these attributes measured? Very roughly the approaches to measuring attributes can be classified as revealed preference (based on actual market behavior) or stated preference (based on hypothetical scenarios). Probably the bestknown revealed preference approach to measure the value of attributes is hedonic pricing (Griliches (1971) ). Rosen (1974) cautioned that hedonic pricing involves an identification problem where neither the demand for nor the supply of attributes is identified. He formulated a theory of hedonic prices in a spatial equilibrium framework where consumer and producer decisions are determined in characteristics space. Rosen explicitly modeled the market equilibrium conditions and provided a practical approach to identify compensated demand and supply functions that could be estimated by econometric methods.
The value of an attribute is frequently measured with a qualitative response model. 6 As above, utility is a function of attributes or characteristics. These models determine the probability that the utility of a particular alternative exceeds the utility of other alternatives. The choice in these models is between discrete alternatives and the dependant variable is the probability of choosing a particular alternative. The choice can either be between two (binomial) or more (multinomial) alternatives. Given that the dependent variable is limited to a specific range of values (between zero and one for a probability) special econometric techniques must be used to estimate the qualitative response model.
Much of the recent research on qualitative measures of attributes uses randomutility models. In this approach utility is the sum of systematic and random components.
The random component reflects the researcher's uncertainty about the choice. While this approach also determines the probability that the utility of one alternative exceeds the utility of other alternatives, the presence of the random component also permits the analyst to make probabilistic statements about consumers' behavior. Different probabilistic choice models can be derived depending on the specific assumptions made about the distribution of the random component. Random utility models are frequently used to rationalize stated choice or preference approaches to measuring attributes. The elasticities were then used to compute price-cost margins that would prevail under different types of market behavior.
So attributes can be modeled conceptually, and a number of empirical studies have developed practical approaches to determine the value of attributes with discrete choice models, and map this information into a demand system that could be used in a market model to conduct policy analysis. However, these approaches require substantial amounts of information on characteristics and are computationally intense. Consequently there is much work to do to institutionalize this framework in a large multi-product market model.
A Case Study of Food Safety Regulations
The discussion of market models, to this point, has been rather general. The purpose of this section is to illustrate these considerations in a case study of modeling food safety regulations.
From an economic perspective there is an optimal level of risk of food borne pathogens, or other contaminates, that is determined where the marginal costs and benefits of any regulation are equated. The challenge is to measure these costs and benefits. There have been a number of cost-benefit analyses of proposed and existing regulations (MacDonald and Crutchfield (1996) , Roberts et al. (1996) ). However, the information developed in cost-benefit analysis is not always the same information that would be desired from a market model. Cost-benefit analysis does not answer questions such as the incidence of additional regulatory costs across consumers and producers. The following sections consider the demand side, supply side and market equilibrium considerations important in modeling food safety regulations.
Demand side considerations
Food safety involves three cross cutting issues: information asymmetries, the risks associated with consumption, and the differentiated nature of products. If consumers are not fully informed about product characteristics they may consume a dangerous product.
Contamination of a food product with a pathogen, or other contaminate, is an experience attribute if the consumer becomes ill. However, with credence attributes (i.e. when the consumer can not detect the quality even after consumption) the consumer does not experience the impact until a much later time.
The analysis of consumer risk aversion is complex (Choi and Jenson (1991) ) and health risks in turn affects price and income elasticities. Studies often indicate that consumers are willing to pay a large premium for zero risk when they already face low risks (Antle (2001)). Consumer perceptions of risk are often inaccurate, in that they do not match scientific evidence of the true risk, and risk preferences are heterogeneous across consumers and across countries.
Applied analyses of food safety have typically employed vertically differentiated product models (Caswell et.al.(2002) ). The problem with vertical differentiation is that quality is assumed to be objectively quantifiable and consumers are assumed to be homogenous. This approach may also have limited success in providing insights into the operation of markets for credence goods. Standards should increase consumer confidence and could increase demand.
Most of the demand side research on food safety is survey based and measures consumers' perceptions about the hazards of products and their willingness to pay for food safety. 8 Due to problems encountered with responses to hypothetical questions, contingent valuation techniques have been combined with experimental auction techniques (Fox et al. (1995) ). Despite the advances in techniques, it is difficult to generalize the willingness to pay to reduce certain risks beyond the context of a given study. 9 Consequently, the information provided by these methods may not be directly relevant to measuring the demand functions that are used a market model. Section 3.0 suggested that discrete choice models could be linked to continuous demand systems, if the important attributes are solicited in the survey or experiment. As well there have been attempts to incorporate consumers concerns directly in conventional demand systems.
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Supply side considerations
The issues of risk and information asymmetries are equally important on the supply side. As well, firms' decisions affect the quality of the product, and they may use quality to differentiate their products as a way to increase their market power. Cost estimates of pathogen reduction are typically accounting or engineering based. However, there have been attempts to estimate cost functions where cost is conditioned not just on output, but also on safety and non-safety attributes. For example, Antle (2000) showed that the cost function could be estimated by combining a hedonic model with a cost function. A firm can also take precautions to reduce the dangers associated with a particular activity. These costs of precaution could be represented by a cost function that includes the probabilistic cost of an accident. Kolsad et al. (1990) showed that the marginal cost of precaution would equal the marginal expected cost of the accident. These regulations are not specified in some absolute monetary amount or as an absolute quantitative limit. Regulations are "complicated specifications of such characteristics as minimum quality, maximum toxicity, ambient characteristics in the production environment, and technical compatibility, along with rules of demonstrating conformity" (Maskus et.al (2001) , p 43). Regulations may raise fixed costs and have no impact on marginal costs. There are a number of uncertainties of how regulations are applied, especially in the international context. Regulations can truncate the distribution of risks faced by producers, affecting both the mean and the variance. Finally, the degree of market power determines how firms will respond to regulations while the presence of product differentiation increases the probability that firms exercise market power.
Complete model considerations
A few theoretical models analyze the market equilibrium for food markets with safety considerations (Falconi and Roe (1991), Holloway (1996) ). For the most part, these studies account for relevant considerations -information asymmetries, market power, differentiated qualities, risk, multiple stage production or marketing processes.
However, from an applied perspective there are relatively few attempts to model food safety regulations with a complete model that brings the demand and supply sides together. These food market equilibrium models are much less complete. Examples of applied approaches link econometric models to epidemiological models, and use an equilibrium displacement model to trace the cost of regulation. A selection of these studies is discussed below.
Mangen and Burrel (2003) Unevehr, Gomez and Garcia (1998) use an equilibrium displacement model to determine the incidence of additional food safety regulations (costs) across various agents and to show the impact on producer welfare. The additional costs of HACCP are used to shift the supply functions for beef, pork, and poultry. Although these products are not substitutes in production they are substitutes on the demand side. The shifts in supply cause changes in relative prices and the model is used to trace the impacts through the system and to determine who bears most of the costs of HACCP. However, the model only accounts for one level of the market. It does not account for imperfect competition, differentiated products, or trade.
The basic problem with market models that address food safety issues is that they are not comprehensive enough. While a particular model may focus on a single aspect of food safety they are not easily integrated into broader models. Nonetheless, in some cases existing commodity models can be used to address the implications of a health regulation. For instance, the implications for prices of the closure of the US border to imports of live Canadian cattle, because of a single reported case of BSE, could be adequately described with a multi-market commodity model.
Equilibrium displacement models may be a potentially fruitful approach because they can accommodate a number of considerations including market power, quality considerations, vertical relationships, and risk. Other issues such as heterogeneity of producers and consumers, information problems, direct quantification of food safety rules, and micro-level analysis of unique situations are best handled with idiosyncratic models. However, these models do not provide the breadth of cross commodity linkages that the econometric multi-purpose commodity models provide.
Conclusions
Both the nature of the agrifood sector and the policies affecting it are changing.
Policy makers require information on a very broad range of issues and no one model can hope to address all of these issues. This paper assessed the information supplied by the large econometric partial equilibrium models currently maintained by a few research institutions. These models have a long history, and are capable of addressing many relevant policy issues. To the extent that most US farm programs are still directed to specific commodities (i.e. program crops) the coverage of these models is often adequate.
Given the shift in the 2002 US Farm Bill back to counter-cyclical payments, these models also provide useful information to help score budgets. The strength of these models is their cross-commodity coverage and the ability to explicitly link interdependent markets.
However, these models are deficient in that they are not well designed to address vertical linkages in the food marketing chain, and do not account for the growing importance of product attributes and intra-industry trade.
Can the existing institutional models be modified to address the six problem areas identified in this study? The answer is generally no, but there is some potential for improvement if the resources and data are available. The net trade nature of these models excludes the examination of intra-industry trade. Accounting for attributes and product differentiation is the most neglected aspect of policy models of any stripe. Product differentiation could not be included in the institutional models without dramatic modifications that completely change the nature of the existing models.
Accounting for the vertical linkages throughout the supply chain is another weakness of the institutional models that are focused on a limited number of raw products and some first level processing activities. Vertical relationships are typically dealt with through marketing margins. Developing a multi-layered model, rather than a marketing margin model, begins with a more complete specification of food processing. With sufficient additional resources this may be possible, but data deficiencies begin to limit the policy questions that can be addressed. Accounting for vertical coordination mechanisms is an order of magnitude more difficult to model and the appropriate data may not be available.
The related issue of market power is also unlikely to be addressed without a model that accounts for product differentiation. Accounting for vertical linkages, especially vertical coordination mechanisms is also necessary for measuring market power. Data limitations are a big impediment to accounting for market power and addressing this issue in a large institutional model does not seem practical.
The significant role of direct payments (decoupled payments) in agricultural policy is also difficult to model. Nonetheless attempts have been made to adjust the large partial equilibrium models to account for the indirect impacts of direct payments (Adams et al.2001 ). Accounting for risk should be a priority in updating commodity models.
Currently, factor markets are not addressed in the institutional models, but conceivably this omission could be rectified. This modification would account for the additional farm level costs of programs, such environmental and food safety programs.
Some of the problems of adequately addressing trade policy, such as modeling the appropriate mechanism for Tariff Rate Quotas, while operationally difficult have been addressed in at least one model. 11 Other broader issues, such as foreign direct investment have not been addressed. However, addressing this issue requires adequate treatment of product differentiation and market power. Again data is a major limitation.
Finally, it is probably not feasible to incorporate food safety considerations and some of the other policy issues discussed in this review into comprehensive institutional models. The existing attempts at modeling food safety concerns are very specialized to the circumstances they were designed to address. It is unlikely that these models can be generalized.
The bottom line is that smaller idiosyncratic models may be better to address many of the issues of concern to policy makers, despite the fact that these models do not provide the broad commodity coverage that the big institutional models provide.
1 See Van Tongeren et.al. for a review and assessment of global partial equilibrium models. 2 For the spillover/feedback effects to be insignificant upstream factor supply should be perfectly elastic and downstream final demand should be perfectly elastic. 3 A typical model based on differentiating a system of logarithmic equations including production functions, first-order conditions, factor supply, and commodity demand, then calibrating them with share and elasticity parameters, and solving them for the multi-market equilibrium elasticities. 4 The 2002 Farm Bill shifted policy back to more conventional commodity programs. However, direct payments remain a large component of the legislation. Even the Counter Cyclical Payments, which are reminiscent of deficiency payments, are based on fixed criteria of historic yields and area. 5 A number of partial and general equilibrium models have used complementary slackness conditions to explicitly model TRQs. 6 Ameniya (1981) provides an excellent survey of the econometric approaches used with qualitative response models. 7 Stated preference methods have advantages in that extended attribute ranges can be used, attributes are uncorrelated by design, and the method can be used to elicit preferences for alternatives that are not yet available (see Adamoicz, Louviere, and Swait 1998). 8 There are methods to use indirect evidence from the market place such as the individual's expenditures on related goods. An example of this technique is the cost of illness approach. 9 Shin et all (1992) extrapolated value to the level of the US population and found a willingness to pay that could be several times larger than cost of illness estimates. 10 Henneberry, Piewthongngam and Qiang (1999) use an AIDS model to incorporate consumer concerns about food safety 11 The OECD has completed a considerable work plan to adapt AGLINK to address a number of trade policy issues such as export credits, export subsidies, etc (see OECD 2000 OECD , 2001 ).
